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INSURANCE - ExcLusIONARY CLAusEs - DEATH DuE TO V10LATION OF THE LAW BY THE INSURED - When a person carrying a
life or accident insurance policy dies as the result of an act committed
by him in violation of the law, the beneficiaries may or may not be
precluded from recovering upon it. In the absence of a special exclusionary clause, the general view is that the beneficiary may recover.1
However, if it appears that at the time the insured took out the policy
he intended to commit a crime recovery is barred, at least if the death
occurred within the contestability period.2 In order to delimit from

1 It is a well established rule of insurance law that the courts will not enforce
a policy which is contrary to public policy. VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., § 75 (1930).
Under the doctrine of implied exceptions, death due to suicide of the insured and
legal execution are considered by many courts to be outside the scope of the policy,
but most courts have not taken the view that death due to violation of the law is an
implied exception. In Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Flickinger,
(C. C. A. 4th, 1929) 33 F'. (2d) 853 at 856, Judge Parker said, "To hold that death
or injury from violation of law defeats recovery under a policy, in the absence of
provision"to that effect in the policy itself, would open up an avenue for evasion of
liability which, so far as our investigation goes, no court has yet seen fit to open. If
insurance companies desire to avoid liability on such grounds, they should insert a
clause in their policies to that effect." To the same effect, see Jordan v. Logia Suprema
De La Alianza Hispano-Americana, 23 Ariz. 584, 206 P. 162 (1922); Domico v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 215, 253 N. W. 538 (1934). Logically it can
be argued that if a court implies an exception as to death due to suicide or legal execution it should likewise apply the same rule when death is due to a violation of the
law, at least if the violation of the law constituted a felony.
2 Such a case would fall within the ordinary doctrines of fraudulent concealment.
VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., §§ 96-98 ( I 930).
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the general coverage provisions the risks that would otherwise exist,
insurance companies often expressly provide that where the death of
the insured is due to an act committed in violation of the law the company shall not be liable. This comment will analyze: (I) the types
of exclusionary clauses and the general rules of construction; (2) the
type of conduct which will constitute a violation of the law within the
meaning of such clauses; (3) the rules of causation which the courts
have established and the application of these rules in order to ascertain
when a causal relation between the unlawful act and death exists; and
( 4) the proper scope and desirability of such clauses. 3
I.

Exclusionary clauses purporting to eliminate the liability of the
insurer when the death of the insured is due to an act committed in
violation of the law are valid.4 Both under the common law and modern insurance codes these express exceptions have received the approval
of the courts. 5 Therefore it is not surprising to find exclusionary clauses
in accident policies carrying death benefits and in ordinary life insurance policies providing for double indemnity in case of accidental
death. 6
An examination of various insurance policies reveals that these
clauses differ somewhat in form. 7 Thus it may be provided that the
insurer shall not be liable or the policy shall not cover "death due to
any act committed in vi.olation of the law," or "death due to an act
committed in violation of the law," or "death due to a known violation
of the law," or "death while committing an act in violation of the
3 This comment does not include a discussion of the analogous problem of what
acts of the insured under a fire or automobile liability insurance policy bar recovery.
Generally mere negligence is insufficient. Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232
N. Y. 161, 133 N. E. 432 (1921); Todd v. Traders' & Mechanics' Ins. Co., 230 Mass.
595, 120 N. E. 142 (1918).
4 Bosler v. Modern Woodmen of America, IO0 Neb. 570, 160 N. W. 966
(1916).
5 An examination of the insurance codes does not indicate that any state denies
the insurer the right to include such clauses in the policy. Naturally, general restrictions as to express exceptions, such as size of print, etc., must be satisfied.
6 In most of the so-called "straight" life insurance policies, clauses of this type
do not appear. An interesting question is presented when such a provision is included
in the typical accident policy. Can death ever be considered to be accidental when it
is due to a violation of the law? Apparently the mere inclusion of this term in the
accident policies is evidence that the question must be answered in the affirmative,
although there is very little direct discussion of the point in the cases.
7 This classification is the result of an examination of modern insurance policies
as well as the language appearing in the cases.
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law." 8 In spite of these variances in language the courts have not as a
general rule emphasized these distinctions in form. 9 However, some
courts have used them as a basis for distinguishing otherwise inconsistent cases,1° and a few have actually based their decisions upon the
form of the clause.11
Of great~r importance in reaching a decision as to the proper scope
of these exceptions are the general rules of construction followed by the
courts in interpreting insurance contracts: (I) when the contract is
ambiguous and is capable of more than one interpretation, the court
will follow the one most favorable to the insured; 12 (2) when a forfeiture will result, the policy will be strictly construed; 18 (3) when a
particular clause is used, it will be interpreted in view of the policy
as a whole.14 These rules are never resorted to unless the clause is
ambiguous,15 but the concept of ambiguity is given a broad interpreta8 Isolated policies contain language, "directly or indirectly" caused by the violation of the law. Perhaps this peculiar language can be used to ~plain the decision of
the Vermont court in Duran v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 63 Vt. 437, 22 A.
530 ( 1891). In that case the insured, while hunting on Sunday contrary to the statute,
slipped and fell on some plowed ground. The court held that there could be no
recovery upon the policy.
• 9 In theory the form of the language might govern the result. The clause
embodying the word "any" might possibly include all violations of the law. If the
policy provided "known," logically it could be said that this clearly contemplated a
crime "mala in se" rather than "malum prohibitum." But the courts apparently do
not make this distinction. See Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478 (1884).
Likewise if the word "criminal" appeared in the provision, a distinction might be
drawn between simple technic,al misdemeanors and common-law misdemeanors. But
the addition of the word "criminal" excludes the possibility of violations of the civil
law from being included. Van Riper v. Constitutional Government League, (Wash.
1939) 96 P. (2d) 588. Also the existence of language "while committing" might be
given special significance. Perhaps this is the justification of the decision of the
Nebraska court in Griffin v. Western Mut. Ben. Assn., 20 Neb. 620, 31 N. W. 122
( 1886), where the court held that death of the insured while fleeing from robbery of
the state treasury did not constitute a defense under the policy.
10 Van Riper v. Constitutional Government League, (Wash. 1939) 96 P. (2d)
588.
11 Distinctions were based upon the word "criminal" in Van Riper v. Constitutional Government League, (Wash. 1939) 96 P. (2d) 588; upon the words "while
committing" in Griffin v. Western Mut. Ben. Assn., 20 Neb. 620, 31 N. W. 122
(1886); and possibly upon the word "known" in Poole v. Imperial Mut. Life &
Health Ins. Co., 188 N. C. 468, 125 S. E. 8 (1924), where the court left up to the
jury whether alighting from a moving train constituted "known violation of the
law."
12 Kangas v. New York Life Ins. Co., 223 Mich. 238, 193 N. W. 867 (1923).
13 Howe v. Patrons M. F. Ins. Co., 216 Mich. 560, 185 N. W. 864 (1921);
Stinchcombe v. New York Life Ins. Co., 46 Ore. 316, 80 P. 213 (1905).
14 Barnett v. Merchants' Life Ins. Co., 87 Okla. 42, 208 P. 271 (1922).
15 Harrington v. Interstate Business Men's Accident Assn., 210 Mich. 327, 178
N. W. 19 (1920).
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tion. However, the importance of these rules should not be overemphasized, as they are merely tools developed by the courts to effectuate the intent of the parties.
The fundamental emphasis should be placed upon an attempt to
ascertain the intent of the parties.16 Since objective intent frequently
can only be determined by a consideration of the practical consequences
that fl.ow from a particular construction, such consequences must be
analyzed and weighed in settling the difficult questions of construction
that arise. The extent to which these considerations enter into the decisions varies, but no court should completely ignore them where the
language to be construed is ambiguous.
2.

Assuming that an insurance policy contains one of the above mentioned exclusionary clauses, the first question is to determine the proper
scope of the term "violation of the law." It is obvious that if the conduct of the insured does not fall within the meaning of the term the
insurer has no defense. 11 Theoretically there are only three types of
acts which might be included within the term "violation of the law''violations of the civil law,18 statutory misdemeanors or "public torts," 19
and common-law misdemeanors and felonies. 20
Irrespective of their nature, by the majority view 21 violations of
the civil law have not been considered as illegal acts within the meaning
of these clauses. In an early Massachusetts case 22 the insured violated
16 Considerations of this sort can be included in the "reasonable" construction
concept followed by the courts. I CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw, § 177
(1929).
17 Of course the insurance company may have a defense under some other express
exception. Most policies contain the provision that the policy "shall be incontestable
after it shall have been in force during the life time of the insured for two years
from its date." But such a clause should have no effect upon an express exception of
this type. Sanders v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1925) IO F.
(zd) 143. But if the provision were worded in the form of a condition-"policy shall
be void"-a different result might be reached, for it is generally held that incontestability clauses cover conditions. This is probably the explanation of the case of
Sun Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 108 Ky. 408, 56 S. W. 668 (1900).
18 If the clause in the policy contains the word "criminal," there is no question
but that civil violations of the law are outside the scope of the exception. But inclusion
of the word "criminal" is uncommon.
19 Professor Beale has used this term to describe minor infractions of the type
discussed in this section. BEALE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW, 3d ed., 81 (1915). See
also 35 HARV. L. REv. 46z (192z).
·
20 The term "common-law misdemeanors" embodies offenses which substantially
increase the risk. It is not used in its technical sense, but rather in this broader meaning for classification purposes.
2 1. 6 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw 4521 (1930).
22 Cluff v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 3 17 ( 1868).
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the civil law by attempting to seize his debtor's property and was killed
in the fight which resulted from this seizure. Even though it was
assumed that a causal relation existed between the tort and the death,
the beneficiary was allowed to recover because the court was of the
opinion that the term "violation of the law" appearing in the policy
referred only to violations of the criminal law. 23 The California court
in a recent decision 24 seems to follow this view. The court clearly was
of the opinion that mere negligence, that is breach of a tort duty, did
not constitute a "violation of the law." However, in an early case the
Indiana court 25 laid down the opposite rule to the effect that civil
violations are included within the term. It said:
"A known violation of a positive law, whether the law is a civil
or a criminal one, avoids the policy if the natural and reasonable
consequences of the violation are to increase the risk; a violation
of the law whether the violation is a civil or a criminal one, does
not avoid the policy if the natural and reasonable consequence of
the act does not increase the risk." 26
It should be noted that the court is not laying down the rule that
all acts in violation of the civil law fall within the clause, but only
those which substantially increase the risk. Perhaps a distinction between simple torts and more serious torts is proper.21 A recent Virginia
case 28 follows this view in a fact situation similar to the one before the
California court. The upper court apparently approved the instruction
of the lower court to the effect that mere negligence constituted a
"viola_tion of the law." Perhaps this is indicative of an extension of the
older Indiana rule. 29
As a technical principle of construction, the word "law" in the
term "violation of law" may refer to civil law or criminal law. This
leaves the question of the proper meaning of the word to the decision
23 But the New York court in Bradley v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 45 N. Y.
422 (1871), took the contrary view of the same facts.
24 Zohner v. Sierra Nevada Life & Casualty Co., II4 Cal. App. 85, 299 P.
749 (1931). Apparently the court took the position that the insured did not violate
the criminal law preventing one from driving upon the left hand side of the road,
and when considered with Davilla v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., I 14 Cal. App. 308, 299
P. 8 31 ( I 931), by negative implication sustains the view that civil violations are not
included.
·
25 Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478 (1884).
26 Ibid., at 484.
21 RrcHARDs, INSURANCE, 4th ed., § 371 (1932), argues in favor of this rule.
28 Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Grimsley, 160 Va. 325, 168 S. E. 329
(1933).
29 If the Virginia court holds that simple acts of negligence are included, this
would seem to be an extension of the Indiana rule.
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of the courts. Although there is a conflict in the case law, it is believed
that the proper view is the one which restricts the meaning to criminal
violations. This construction is more consistent with the general rule
that ambiguous language is construed most strongly against the insurer.30 Moreover such a construction does not allow the insurance
company to escape liability when the insured's death is due to mere
negligence. 31 Furthermore, this construction protects the reasonable
expectations of the insured consonant with the practical considerations
suggested before. 32
Somewhat the same considerations apply to statutory misdemeanors
or "public torts." One type of statutory misdemeanors are those arising
from the statutes and ordinances regulating the owners of automobiles.
Practically every state has passed regulations concerning drivers'
licenses, automobile licenses, tail lights, horns, et cetera, the violation
of which, by statutory definition, constitute misdemeanors. 33 Applying
a combination of technical rules of construction and practical policy
considerations, courts have concluded that these infractions are not
"violations of the law" within the purview of these clauses. 34
A second type of statutory misdemeanors are those involving violations of traffic regulations. Almost without exception states and municipalities have enacted speed regulations and other laws of this type. 35
At least four jurisdictions have definitely held that these violations
fall within the scope of these exclusionary clauses. 36 However, a contrary construction has been adopted in a recent Washington case.37
This decision is particularly interesting because the policy contained
the provision that the insurer should not be liable if the death were
due to an act committed in "criminal violation of the law." The in30 Supra, note 12.
As is possible under the Virginia view.
It is doubtful whether the ordinary layman reading the term "violation of
law'' would believe that mere negligent acts were to be included within its scope.
33 Most frequently the statute will prescribe specific rules, followed by a provision
making the violations of those laws misdemeanors punishable by the imposition of stated
penalties.
34 Surprisingly little case law can be found directly upon this point. Fischer v.
Midland Casualty Co., 189 Ill. App. 486 (1914). The same result may be reached
by holding that there is no causal relation between the insured's death or injuries and
the violation of the law.
35 For example, see Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1939), § 12603 et seq. (1939).
36 Rowe v. United Commercial Travelers' Assn., 186 Iowa 454, 172 N. W.
454 (1919); Davilla v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 308, 299 P. 831
(1931); Witt v. Spot Cash Ins. Co., 128 Kan. 155, 216 P. 804 (1929); Ayres v.
Atlas Ins. Co., 123 Neb. 285, 242 N. W. 604 (1932). But see Washington Fidelity
Nat. Ins. Co. v. Herbert, 49 Ohio App. 151, 195 N. E. 492 (1935).
37 Van Riper v. Constitutional Government League, (Wash. 1939) 96 P. (2d)
588.
31

32
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sured had run through a stop sign contrary to the law and was killed
as the result of a collision with another automobile. The court seized
upon the word "criminal" to distinguish the other cases, but it did not
base its decision entirely upon this formal distinction. It was of the
opinion that even if the word "criminal" had not appeared in the
clause the same result would have been reached. Most courts have not
expressly passed upon the point whether traffic infractions are within
the scope of the term "violation of the law."
It is believed that when the great majority of the courts are faced
directly with this problem, irrespective of the exact form of the language used in the exclusionary clause,88 they will hold that traffic
infractions are not within the meaning of these clauses. In reaching
such a result the courts will not be violating any known principles of
construction 89 and they certainly will be laying down a rule more in
keeping with the reasonable expectations of the parties.40 In some
cases, as will be subsequently noted, a court might hold that traffic
infractions are within the scope of these clauses, but will deny recovery
upon the basis that the violation was not the proximate cause of the
insured's death. 41
Other acts of a similar nature that can still be classified as statutory
misdemeanors have been held to be outside these clauses. Thus, courts
have concluded that violations of a statute making it a misdemeanor to
possess a hypodermic needle,42 to work on Sunday,43 to ride on the side
of a truck,44 to get off a moving railroad car,45 are not "violations of
the law" within the meaning of these provisions.
An almost unbroken line of decisions indicate that common-law
misdemeanors and felonies are included within the term "violation of
the law." This is illustrated by cases where the insured was killed in the
Of course this at most can be nothing but a prediction or conjecture.
Supra,.notes 12, 13 and 14.
40 It is submitted that the reasonable expectancies of the parties is that only
common-law misdemeanors and felonies that substantially increase the risk are included.
41 As a matter of fact, all of the decisions now· are in such a state of confusion that
the true basis of the decision is almost impossible to ascertain. This confusion is the
result of the failure to distinguish between the question of the scope of the clause and
that of legal causation.
42 Townsend v. Coni.mercial Travelers' Mut. Accident Assn. of America, 23 l N. Y.
148, 131 N. E. 871 (1921). It is submitted that this should be considered as the
real basis of this decision although the court discussed chiefly the point of causation.
48 Matthes v. Imperial Accident Assn., IIO Iowa 222, 81 N. W. 484 (1900).
But see Duran v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 63 Vt. 437, 22 A. 530 (1891).
44 Reynolds v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 166 S. C. 214, 164 S. E.
602 (1932). The chief point discussed by the court is one of proximate cause.
45 Nat. Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Lokey, 166 Ala. 174, 52 So. 45 (1910). Perhaps
this case can be considered to be based solely upon a pleading point.
38
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act of robbing a bank,46 while gambling,47 while cqmmitting an assault, 48
or while driving in a state of intoxication.49 However, the commission
of one of these crimes must be voluntary, and if the insured is insane
at the time of the commission the insurer cannot claim exemption. But
in policies which provide that any act of the insured whether "sane or
insane," shall exempt the insurer from liability, by the better view, this
additional language covers the case where the crime was committed
while the insured was insane. 50
•
Suicide when not made a crime by statute does not bar recovery
under one of these clauses. 61 However, in some jurisdictions,62 even
though it is made a crime expressly by statute, it has been held outside
their scope. Usually there is an express clause exempting the insurance
company from liability if the death was due to suicide, so that the insurance company is protected irrespective of the rule followed in a particular jurisdiction. 63 The courts excluding suicide offer little rational
explanation for their position, often merely saying that the crime of
suicide must be treated differently from others. 54
Admitting that the courts are in conflict as to whether violations
of the civil law and statutory misdem~anors are included within these
exclusionary clauses, it seems that their scope should be restricted to
common-law misdemeanors and felonies. Such a construction will conform to the general rules of construction followed by the courts in
interpreting insurance contracts. 55 Nor will such a construction result in
any unfairness to the insurer. Insurance companies in ascertaining the
premium rates base their conclusions upon mortality tables which take
into account deaths due to all causes, including minor infractions of the
law. From the insured's standpoint any other construction would defeat
46 Haley v. Prudential Ins. Co., 189 Ill. 317, 59 N. E. 545 (1901); Ben Hur
Life Assn. v. Cox, 181 Ind. App. 166, 181 N. E. 528 (1932). See 31 M1cH. L.
REv. 856 (1933).
47 Landry v. Independent Nat. Life Ins. Co., 17 La. App. 10, 135 So. 110
(1931).
48 Supreme Lodge, K. P. v. Bradley, 73 Ark. 274, 83 S. W. I055 (1904).
49 Flannagan v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1927) 22 F. (2d)
136.
50 VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., 814 (1930).
51 Royal Circle v. Achterrath, 204 Ill. 549, 68 N. E. 492 (1903).
52 Patterson v. Natural Premium Mut. Life Ins. Co., 100 Wis. I 18, 75 N. W.
980 (1898).
58 Practically every policy contains such a provision. At least within the period of
contestability the defense can be asserted.
H Patterson v. Natural Premium Mut. Life. Ins. Co., IOO Wis. 118, 75 N. W.
980 (1898).
55 Supra, notes I 2, 13, and Lf.•
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his reasonable expectations. 56 Moreover, the protective aspects of the
policy would be reduced to a "shadow," if the insurance company were
allowed to escape liability because the insured's death was due to some
act of negligence or minor infraction of the law. Although insurance
coverage is essentially a question of contract law, these policy factors
should be taken into consideration by .the courts in order to reach the
preferred view suggested. 57

3.
Assuming that a particular mode of conduct does fall within the
meaning of an exclusionary clause, before it precludes recovery it must
be shown that it was the proximate cause of the insured's death. 58
Although an examination of the decisions upon this point will divulge
that some courts are apparently committed to the view that to avoid
liability there need only be a showing that the death of the insured
occurred while engaged in a criminal act, 59 most of these decisions
reveal, upon closer examination, that the courts are not repudiating
the necessity of causation but merely giving the concept a very liberal
interpretation. 60 The real question, then, is to determine what kind
of causal relation is legally sufficient.
Practically all the courts lay down the rule that "death must be the
natural and probable consequence of the unlawful act." 61 The term
"natural and probable" is conveniently ambiguous. In an attempt to
formulate a more definite and workable rule some courts have promulgated the "but for" test-"but for the unlawful act, would death have
resulted?" 62 Although the "but for" test may be properly applied to
establish a factual causation, a blind reliance upon the doctrine leads
to ridiculous results. 63 Therefore, in order to circumvent this possibility,
other courts 64 have laid down the rule that the death of the insured
must be the "foreseeable" consequence of the violation of the law.
It is suggested that the "foreseeable" test should be applied in prefer56 But this assertion might be questioned. RICHARDS, INSURANCE, 4th ed., § 371
(1932).
57 Every court directly or indirectly considers these practical aspects in determining which construction to follow.
58 VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., § 230 (1930).
59 6 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw 4513 at note 8 (1930).
6 ° For example, see Duran v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 63 Vt. 437, 22 A.
530 (1891).
61 Bradley v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 422 (1871); Insurance Co. v.
Bennett, 90 Tenn. 256, 16 S. W. 723 (1891); 17 A. L. R. 1005 (1922).
62 National Ben. Assn. v. Bowman, IIO Ind. 355, II N. E. 316 (1891).
63 It is always possible to say in a factual sense, but for the violation of law death
would not have resulted.
64 Cox v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (Mo. App. 1937) 109 S. W. (2d) 694. Jones
v. United States Mutual Accident Assn., 92 Iowa 652, 61 N. W. 485 (1894).
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ence to the "but for" test. Through the application of this test, the
court's attention will at least be directed to a consideration of the real
factors underlying the "violation of the law." 65 Concededly the only
purpose of rules of causation is to provide a rational basis for distinguishing between acts which are mere conditiop.s and those which
in the legal sense are the proximate cause.
An examination of the cases fails to disclose any greater uniformity
in result than exists in the theory of causal relation. Any analysis of the
decisions is further complicated by the fact that the question of the
scope of the clause is often inextricably commingled with the question
of the existence of proximate cause. In the extreme cases, irrespective
of the theory of causation adopted by the court, a uniform result will
be obtained. For example, if the insured, while robbing a bank, is
killed by a bolt of lightning, no court should have difficulty in reaching
the result that there was no proximate causal relation between the death
and the. unlawful act. Likewise, if the insured brutally assaulted a
person, and that person, while using reasonable force in self defense,
killed the insured, no court should hesitate in saying that the unlawful
assault was the legal cause of the death. 66
The decisions which cause difficulty are the ones which fall within
these two extremes. For example, if the insured is engaged in a gambling game contrary to the statute, and is killed by one of the participants, is the gambling game a condition or the proximate cause of the
death? Of if the insured, while engaged in an illegal horse race, is
killed, is the illegal activity the proximate cause of the insured's death?
In both of these cases,67 the courts have held that there was a sufficient
causal relation between the death and the "violation of the law" but
without much discussion of the theory underlying the holding. In
another case where the insured was committing adultery and was killed
by the enraged husband who happened upon the scene, 68 the court
held that there was no causal relation between the crime and the
death of the insured. The court said that from the crime of adultery it
was not foreseeable that death would result. It distinguished the crime
of adultery in this respect from robbery and assault. Although from a
factual standpoint the decision might be criticized,69 it is submitted that
the logic and reasoning of the court is sound.
In cases dealing with an insured who has been shot by a police
65 For a discussion of this point, see Todd v. Traders' & Mechanics' Ins. Co.,
230 Mass. 595, 120 N. E. 412 (1918).
66 Murray v. New York Life Ins. Co., 96 N. Y. 614 (1884).
67 Landry v. Independent Nat. Life Ins. Co., 17 La. App. IO, 135 So. 110
(1931); Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Seaver, 19 Wall. (86 U.S.) 531 (1873).
68 Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Crenshaw, 129 Ga. 195, 58 S. E. 628 (1907).
69 lt might be said that under the circumstances death was reasonably foreseeable.
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officer while attempting to escape after the commission of a felony,7°
some courts have adopted arbitrary rules of causation, leading to a
result which lias no foundation in logic or policy. Likewise, some courts
have given special consideration to cases invplving death by the insured while he was committing an assault. 71
There are many other cases involving determination whether the
unlawful act. was the proximate cause of the death.12 The unfortunate
aspect of these cases is the loose language used by the court in marking
out- the limits of causal relation. Most of this difficulty could be eliminated by the adoption of a concrete test like the "foreseeable" test. If
the courts were to adopt this test, the decisions would probably tend to
be more uniform and certainly would be based upon sounder principles
of law.78

4.
There is little doubt but that exclusionary clauses purporting to
exclude liability when the death of the insured is due to an act committed in violation of the law will continue to be included in policies
of insurance and the courts will continue to be faced with the problem
of interpreting them in light of varying fact situations. Today, with
the increasing number of laws crystallizing modes of conduct and making the failure to conform to such conduct a violation of the law, it
becomes of greater significance, both for the insured and the insurer,
to be able accurately to define their scope and legal effect. Admitting
the possibility that insurance companies, in order to obtain the broadest
possible effect, might word these clauses so as expressly to include
statutory misdemeanors and death even directly caused by such violations, this is not a probability. The high ethics of insurance companies
plus the threat of restrictive legislation will probably prevent an enlargement of the scope of these provisions. Therefore it can be assumed
that these exceptions will continue to be similarly worded.
In every case where the insurer claims exemption under a clause
of this type there are two distinct legal propositions which must be
established: (I) that the act of the insured was an act in violation of
the law within the meaning of the term, and ( 2) that the death of
the insured was caused by the violation of the law. Unless these ques70 Jordan v. Logia Suprema De La Alianza Hispano-Americana, 23 Ariz. 584,
206 P. 162 (1922); Griffin v. Western Mutual Assn., 20 Neb. 620, 31 N. W. 122
(.1886).
71 Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hargraves, 169 Tenn. 388, 88 S. W. (2d) 451
(1935), reflects the sounder view.
72 See 17 A. L. R. 1005 (1922).
78 The authorities seem to favor the "foreseeable" test. See HARPER, ToRTS, §
I l l (1933).

1940

J

COMMENTS

1285

tions are separated, the case law will continue to be conflicting. No one
will be able to predict with any accuracy the rule which the court will
follow in a fact situation which varies from a decided one. In some
fields of the law the gradual process of inclusion and exclusion, leaving
the result in a given fact situation to be "pricked" out, is justified 74 but
certainly not here. Irrespective of whether a court follows the view
that only common-law misdemeanors and felonies are included within
the term "violation of the law" or applies the "foreseeable" test to
determine the question of proximate causation, it is imperative that
each of these two questions be treated separately by the court in reaching its decision.
Robert A. Solomon

74 In the field of constitutional law, policy factors may create a necessity for frequent changes and consequently it may be impossible for the courts to formulate
crystallized concepts of law. However, such a necessity does not prevail in the field of
insurance law where the principles of contract law are controlling.

